



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

THE THEORY OF EMIGRATION.

Professor Philippovich, of the University of Freiburg in Baden, is the author of the article on "Auswanderung" in Conrad's *Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften*, and also of an article on "L'Émigration Européenne" in the *Revue d'Economie Politique*. Both articles contain the usual historical and statistical information on the subject, while the latter is noteworthy for some very clever and suggestive remarks on the economic effects of emigration. Recent continental writers (as, for example, Rümelin, Herzog, and Becker) have been inclined to deplore modern emigration as draining Europe of the most productive and strongest elements in its population. They have tried to express the economic loss in terms of money, not, indeed, on Engel's old basis of the cost of rearing the emigrant from childhood to manhood, but by the method long ago pointed out by Farr (Philippovich wrongly gives the credit of it to Becker) of capitalizing the value of the laborer's future earnings, diminished by his future expenses of living. It has been generally conceded that, if we care to estimate the economic value of human beings without reference to their moral character and their social environment, this is the correct method. Of course, the "if" is very important, and in the question of emigration compels us to consider not merely the loss of the emigrants, but also whether those who remain behind are not better off, owing to diminished economic pressure. Professor Philippovich not only states this question theoretically, but seems inclined to answer it affirmatively for the countries of Europe. He says (on page 369):—

Il y a en Europe des territoires où une augmentation des forces du travail correspondant à l'augmentation naturelle de la population équivaldrait à une diminution du bien-être économique de la totalité de leurs habitants. La Suède et la Norvège, qui ont un excédant de naissances de 12 à 13 0/00,—alors que l'Allemagne n'en a que de 10 à 11 0/00, et, la France de 2 0/00,—ne pourraient nourrir une telle augmentation de population. La répartition des terres en Irlande a jusqu'à présent rendu impossible l'extension de la classe des paysans. La diminution des progrès industriels de l'Angleterre rend impossible l'emploi des bras

dont le nombre va toujours croissant. En Suisse, où l'émigration se recrute surtout dans la classe agricole, il pourrait se faire que ceux que ne peut plus occuper l'agriculture se tournassent vers l'industrie; car le chiffre des étrangers qui s'en occupent croît de jour en jour. Mais peut-on faire un reproche aux paysans de ce qu'ils préfèrent l'indépendance du cultivateur à l'étranger au dur travail des fabriques? Dans l'Allemagne orientale l'extension de la grande propriété empêche l'augmentation de la classe agricole. Les individus privés de terre doivent-ils augmenter le nombre de ceux qui demandent du travail dans les villes? Les progrès de la technique ne sont-ils pas en lutte continuelle avec ceux qui en sont réduits à travailler de leurs mains, et l'industrie ne réduit-elle le nombre de ceux qu'elle occupe? C'est ainsi que certains faits nous indiquent qu'à considérer la chose en grand, on ne peut parler de la perte qu'occasionne l'émigration.

The outcome of these observations is that, although emigration may cause temporary inconvenience to particular localities, yet, taking it all in all and for the whole community, it responds to a permanent economic necessity. As the author says, it has become "*un phénomène normal du développement de la vie en Europe.*" What are commonly alleged as immediate causes of emigration — political and religious oppression, economic misfortune, and even social misery — produce but greater or less fluctuations, and in countries where the migratory tendency has firmly established itself they do not even perceptibly disturb the average from decade to decade. The real cause of emigration in our time is the temptation to better one's economic position; and this cause works not only in times of depression at home, but also in times of prosperity. The improved means of communication and the intimate relations established between the New World and even the smallest villages in Europe bring this temptation to the door of each individual. He may succeed in the New World; at the worst, he can return.

If, now, emigration rests on such a permanent and enduring influence, when will it come to an end? The answer of the author is as follows (page 371): —

Si des obstacles imprévus ne viennent pas le ralentir, il ne cessera pas avant qu'il n'ait réussi à établir le même niveau économique. Le double contraste qu'il tend à aplanir sont, là-bas, bas prix des terres et hauts salaires; ici, haut prix des terres et bas salaires. Le mouvement tend à établir le niveau par la hausse. Il pourrait se faire aussi qu'il fût

établi par la baisse des salaires là-bas, par celle du prix des terres ici. Mais de nombreux obstacles s'opposent à la réalisation mathématique de cette possibilité, de sorte que nous ne pouvons attendre l'égalisation que de la colonisation successive des territoires de notre terre qui ne sont pas encore occupés. Le Canada, les États-Unis, l'Amérique du Sud, l'Australie, l'Afrique méridionale, territoires qui sont quatre ou cinq fois plus grands que toute l'Europe, mais qui ne comptent que 160 millions d'habitants, tandis qu'elle en compte 316, permettent l'extension des races européennes pour un temps illimité. Mais jusqu'à quand leurs habitants consentiront-ils à recevoir l'émigration européenne ? Il semble déjà maintenant que la puissance d'expansion des jeunes nations qui occupent ces territoires commence à s'opposer à l'expansion de l'Europe. . . . Comment cela finira-t-il ? Une seule chose nous apparaît au bout de cette longue perspective, c'est que l'Europe finira par occuper une place plus modeste. La civilisation avance irrésistiblement, et jusqu'à présent elle a constamment marché de l'Orient vers l'Occident. Pendant des siècles, l'Europe a fait parvenir à une magnifique floraison les semences qu'elle avait reçues de l'Orient. Elle ne peut pas espérer qu'il en sera toujours ainsi. Lorsque l'Amérique fut découverte, "l'Occident européen," pour parler comme Karl Ritter, "devint un Orient," et c'est au delà de la mer que semble devoir être le théâtre où le genre humain atteindra sa plus haute maturité, mais un théâtre que l'Europe aura peuplé par son émigration.

This theory (as I have ventured to call it) of emigration seems to me worthy of notice, not only on account of its finish and completeness, and the general spirit of cosmopolitanism which breathes through it, but more particularly on account of its bearing on the present tendency in the United States to restrict immigration. The author notices this tendency, but only in passing, and does not pretend to criticise it. If, however, his theory be true, then the restriction of immigration will have two very important consequences to answer for, namely, (1) of disturbing the normal conditions of life in Europe and throwing whole populations into economic distress, and (2) of interrupting the expansion of European civilization and the progress of the world. It is true that we can defend our present immigration laws on the ground that they are merely of a police nature, intended to prevent the influx of criminals and paupers. The number actually kept out is so small, also, that the legislation has no economic significance. But I think we ought to go further, and consider the possible results of the policy which we are initiating. We do not need

to be chauvinistic in this matter, and we do not want to precipitate economic evils from which the whole world will suffer. I venture to throw out the following suggestions as to the way in which we should view the matter from our side of the water.

The connection between population and emigration seems to me too uncertain for us to found thereon any theory of the economic effect of emigration. It is true that, as a rule, those nations which have a large emigration have also a large birth-rate, so that emigration does not depopulate the country. But which is the cause and which the effect? Is emigration caused by the pressure of population? or does emigration simply make room for the increase of population? In France we have very slight emigration and a very slow increase of population. Why is not that the normal condition of things? and, if emigration were to stop (not suddenly, of course, but gradually), why would not other countries regulate their population according to the new conditions? It seems to me just as logical to take hold of the question from the other end, and to formulate the rule that emigration is no remedy for overpopulation. Such a theory might be supported by the fact that the population of Germany, for instance, continues to increase in spite of emigration; that Ireland is still miserable, notwithstanding the fact that millions of her citizens have expatriated themselves; that even the most sanguine Englishmen hope to relieve the congestion of East London only by state-aided emigration on a large scale, with the prospect that even then the void will probably be filled by the influx of provincials and foreigners. I do not desire to dilate on the further difficulty that voluntary emigration drains the community of the cream of its working classes, while assisted emigration will always shatter on the perfectly justifiable unwillingness of the countries of the New World to receive the refuse of the Old. Any country whose prosperity depends on the constant expatriation of a portion of its citizens stands in an equivocal position; and it seems to me impossible to regard emigration as a permanent and normal function of European life.

The proposition that emigration will continue until equilibrium is reached by decreasing the price of land and increasing the rate of wages in Europe, and increasing the price of land and decreasing wages here, has a very dubious sound to American ears. It seems to imply that rent and wages are dependent merely on population. It is possible, however, that American wages are high on account of the efficiency of labor, and remain high in accordance with the standard of living. All the influences, moreover, which Professor Philippovich mentions as making emigration necessary for Europe, such as the natural increase of population, the accumulation of land in great estates, the undesirability of driving the tiller of the soil from the country into the city and factory, the progress of science in inventing substitutes for manual labor,—all these are present in greater or less degree here, and would seem to make immigration unnecessary for us. Neither is it chauvinistic to inquire what will be the ultimate result of this process of levelling on our economic condition; that is, on the comfort of the mass of the people. It has not been shown conclusively that emigration is improving the condition of Europe. We can demand at least so much, before we run any risk of lowering our own. Even then our cosmopolitan duty does not appear altogether plain. We cannot solve the problem by using general expressions about the “expansion of European civilization” or the “star of empire” taking its way westward. The expansion of European civilization no longer needs the transmigration of millions of Europeans, any more than mediæval Europe needed renewed migrations from Asia. The seed has been planted; it needs but care and cultivation. The energizing influence which we now get from Europe, and which it is to be hoped we shall always get, and be able more and more to give back, is the spiritual and intellectual influence, not the mere transplanting of the raw material of labor. And here cannot we broaden Professor Philippovich’s own proposition, that we must study concrete relations before we can judge whether emigration is a loss, into the general one that each nation is obliged of necessity to regard emigration or immigration, and allow or restrict the same, from the standpoint of the effect on its own civilization?

RICHMOND MAYO SMITH.